New Zealand, as in other jurisdictions, has a range of recognized trusts that would be familiar to many. These include express trusts, resulting trusts, constructive trusts, and charitable trusts. Perhaps more unfamiliar, at least to those outside New Zealand, are trusts that are unique to the New Zealand legal landscape and that are specific to Maori land. This article explores the relevance, and importance, of such trusts within New Zealand-Aotearoa. In doing so, the author considers a number of these Maori land trusts, and critically evaluates a range of issues, which includes governance; conflict of interest; unsatisfactory conduct; and dysfunction. While Maori land trusts are subject to the general laws of trust, it can be seen from the article how valuable such trusts are in recognizing and protecting Maori interests. As such, their unique nature reflects their fundamental relevance in indigenous culture, and also generally as an effective management tool for much Maori land.
Introduction
There are several types of equitable interest in property, trusts being just one of them, and it is likely that trusts are the best known of the types of equitable interest. Other equitable interests include equitable leases, and equitable mortgages. With respect to trusts, the beneficiary, who is the equitable interest holder, has the right to compel the legal owner, the trustee to recognize, and give effect to the beneficiary's interest. The nature of the interest held by the beneficiary will depend on the terms of the trust.
1 There is also a range of trusts that are recognized in New Zealand, like other jurisdictions, which include express trusts, resulting trusts, constructive trusts, and charitable trusts. In addition to these recognized trusts, New Zealand has a unique range of trusts specific to Maori land. The Maori Land Court has exclusive jurisdiction to constitute the five types of Maori trusts, and these are authorized by the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 (Maori Land Act 1993), and are as follows:
Ahu Whenua-this is the main form of trust where the total freehold interest in Maori land or General land owned by Maori is vested in a trust/trustee by the Maori Land Court, and is utilized to promote and facilitate the use and administration of the land for those who are beneficial owners of the land. This type of trust is the equivalent of section 438 trust under the now repealed Maori Affairs Act 1953. Whanau-these are share-managed type trusts. Such trusts were introduced under the Act and under them, land interests of the living or the deceased owner are vested in trustees, generally family members, and no further succession or fragmentation occurs.
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Whenua Topu-such trusts are similar to the ahu whenua trusts, in that they are land-management trusts, but whenua topu trusts operate to facilitate the use and administration of the land in the interests of iwi 4 or hapu, 5 as opposed to those with a beneficial interest in the land.
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Kai Tiaki-where real or personal property owned by a Maori person under disability is vested by the Maori Land Court in a trustee(s). 7 This is the only trust that relates solely to individuals. Such trusts can work under the umbrella of whanau, putea, ahu whenua or whenua topu trusts, or Maori incorporations. Putea-these are share management type trusts, which are designed to manage impractical, or undesirable, limited value interests, or to manage interests where those with beneficial interests are not known. 9 Limited numbers of these trusts have been created.
New Zealand has a unique range oftrusts specific to Maori land
It is worthwhile noting that Maori land can be held on trust by other means. Maori are at liberty to utilize other forms of trust to hold land, thus drawing on other forms of trust law. 10 To contextualize these types of unique trusts within the New Zealand legal landscape, it is worthwhile setting out, briefly, the historical and modern-day positions of the Crown within New Zealand-Aotearoa.
By Article 1 of the Treaty of Waitangi, 11 a number of Maori chiefs purported to cede to the Crown absolutely all of their rights and powers of sovereignty.
By Article 2, the Crown confirmed and guaranteed to the, inter alia, Maori chiefs and tribes the full and undisturbed possession of their land and possessions, as long as they wished it. The Treaty was written in Maori and English. It is acknowledged that there has been difficulty in reconciling the two language versions, meaning that there still to this day is uncertainty as to what was intended to be ceded, and what was intended to be reserved. 12 This is expressed eloquently by Cooke P in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General: There is continuing debate over the effect of the Treaty, and it is acknowledged that 'Treaty issues are a study in themselves and the literature is voluminous.' 14 It is not the intention of this article to explore these issues further. The reality however is that the Section 131 of the Act gives the Maori Land Court jurisdiction to determine and declare the particular status of a parcel of land.
As mentioned earlier, the Act provides for five types of Maori trusts that relate mainly to Maori land, and the Maori Land Court has exclusive jurisdiction to constitute these authorized Maori trusts, which are ahu whenua; whanau; kai tiaki; putea; and whenua topu, as described above. 22 However, like other trusts, they can also be constituted by will or deed, and given effect to by a court order, on the proviso that there is no conflict with the Act.
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It should be noted that the topic of Maori land trusts is very expansive, and as a result, it will be outside the scope of this article to consider all the matters pertaining to such trusts, and indeed to consider each type of trust in detail. Therefore, this article focuses on some key discussion points to highlight the significance and relevance of Maori land trusts in the New Zealand legal landscape. We therefore turn now to considering some of those five statutory forms of Maori land trust, concentrating in particular on the more common types of Maori land trusts, beginning with ahu whenua trusts.
Ahu whenua trusts
As mentioned above, this is the main form of trust where the total freehold interest in Maori land or General land owned by Maori is vested in a trust/ trustee by the Maori Land Court, and is utilized to 16 More recently, the case of Parengarenga 3D v Slade 29 also highlighted issues surrounding the very real importance of good governance, and illustrates the serious impact of poor governance. Parengarenga 3D comprises approximately 500 hectares, and had been committed to plantation forestry for about 30 years. This case concerned the alleged misappropriation of funds and an application for a Mareva injunction to secure Trust assets. 30 While inevitably the case focused on questions applicable to Mareva injunctions, the discussions also illustrated very real issues regarding governance of the Trust, and the lack of any documentation to support payments to the former trustees, and their lack of responses, supported a good arguable case of equitable, if not, actual fraud. 31 This meant that there were significant questions to be answered by those trustees 32 in relation to their governance and their duties towards the Trust in question. On the face of it, the four former trustees appear, at the very least:
to have acted without any appreciation or understanding of the fiduciary obligations they owed to the trust.
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The losses attributed to the poor governance were so serious that they were reported in the national press. 34 Therefore, ensuring good governance generally is key in managing Maori land trusts such as ahu whenua trusts, as with other types of trusts. However, governance may also be considered in more specific terms, including issues surrounding a number of trustees' duties, such as conflict of interest and improper behaviour for a trustee, to which this article now turns specifically in relation to such trusts.
Conflict of interest
Harvey J, in the case of Re Tauhara Middle 15 Trust,   35 addressed the issue of conflict of interest in relation to Tauhara Middle 15, which is Maori freehold land, with over 3000 beneficial owners, and the land is administered by an ahu whenua trust. There were a number of issues under discussion in this case, but our focus rests on the conflict of interest in this instance. The trustees of Tauhara Middle 15 Trust, in a complex number of transactions, purchased land via the Hikuwai Hapu Lands Trust. The allegations were raised in terms of the roles of the trustees, the competing interests of the various trusts, particularly Hikuwai, and the trustees' duties to the beneficiaries. 36 The affected trustees sat on all three trusts involved in the purchase, and all three trusts were advised, or at least encouraged, by the same solicitors over the decision whether or not to enter the purchase. 37 What was made clear by the Judge was that in matters relating to conflict of interest, it is not sufficient to declare that conflict at a meeting, nor is it sufficient to attempt to have it waived by the meeting of owners. 38 The duty to ensure that there is no conflict of interest is far more strict than that. Indeed, a trustee's decision can even be 'tainted given the potential for and appearance of conflict'. 39 It might however have been possible to have dealt with that potential or appearance of conflict by taking their solicitor's advice and applying for directions, which was not done. Therefore, Harvey J concluded that the three affected trustees did place themselves in actual, or 30 Three of the trustees were alleged to have conflicts of interest, on which the Supreme Court commented, although it has remitted the issue to the Maori Land Court for final decisions on the conflicts in light of the judgment, because the Supreme Court was not certain that it had all the relevant information. With regard to trustee Pirihira Fenwick, the Court held that she was interested or concerned in the joint venture arrangements because she was a beneficiary of one of the trusts, with an approximate 4.71 per cent share in that trust. As a result, she:
had a real and appreciable possibility of conflict between interest and duty and should not have taken part in the decision making process. 44 With regard to trustee Tai Eru, the Court noted that his interest in the trust would be de minimus, in other words, there was likely 'no sensible possibility of conflict'. 45 However, what was noted in the footnotes by the Supreme Court was that even a very small interest in a very large transaction could still raise the possibility of a conflict between interest and duty. However, in this situation, the Court was not sufficiently apprised of all the information pertaining to the joint venture to make a definitive finding on this point. Nonetheless, what this does speak to is the very serious obligations imposed upon trustees of ahu whenua trusts to ensure that conflicts of interest do not arise. With regard to the third trustee, the late Winnie Emery, the Court held that while her husband was a trustee of one of the trusts involved, this did not render her as conflicted under section 227A of the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. 46 In application to Mrs Fenwick, and possibly Mr Eru, the Court determined that under section 227A(2), the former (and possibly the latter), should not have participated in the discussions surrounding the transactions, or in the voting. The section states the following: 47 A trustee must not vote or participate in the discussion on any matter before the trust that directly or indirectly affects that person's remuneration or the terms of that person's employment as a servant or officer of the trust, or that directly or indirectly affects any contract in which that person may be interested or concerned other than as a trustee of another trust.
It had been argued that the breach of section 227A(2) had no effect, given the ability for decisions to be made by a majority, however, the Court was in agreement with the Court of Appeal that all trustees, who take part in decision making, must 'bring to bear a mind unclouded by any contrary interest'. 48 and of influencing fellow decision makers (again, consciously or subconsciously).
In relation to the notion of influence, whether conscious or subconscious, the Court pertinently noted that a court is not best placed to 'decide the existence and the extent of any influence'. 55 The reality is that evidence pertaining to influence, or otherwise, is limited, and trustees will be required to 'reconstruct the decision-making process with the benefit of hindsight', which could falsify the process, and indeed, if the influence has been subconscious, then the trustees will not even be aware of it to express its impact.
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This, therefore, drives to the heart of the matter. Conflicts of interest can be insidious, and their effects may be wide ranging and highly damaging. As a result, the stringent burdens upon trustees to avoid conflicts of interest are well placed and much desirous to protect the interests of the beneficiaries. So, while it is evident that all trustees are duty bound to avoid such conflicts, 57 contemporary evidence points to such duties being equally measured for trustees of ahu whenua trusts. Avoiding a conflict of interest is clearly an important obligation for all ahu whenua trust trustees, but equity imposes numerous other duties on such trustees, including the requirement to ensure that their conduct is befitting a trustee. Unsatisfactory conduct can take a variety of forms, and we will consider some circumstances within ahu whenua trusts where trustee conduct has fallen under the spotlight.
Unsatisfactory conduct
In Articlestrustee decision, and cultivating illegal drugs on trust property. In relation to the latter allegation, Harvey J dealt with this promptly. Quite simply, the conviction of an imprisonable offence for carrying out activities on trust land, of which she was a trustee, with the responsibility of acting in the best interests of the beneficiaries could hardly be construed as acting prudently or appropriately for a trustee. As such, her position was quite untenable. 59 While this seems entirely proper to take such a firm stance, the Judge was in no way prepared to be lenient even with the trustee expressing regret as to her actions overall. This illustrates the very seriousness of the duties of trustees, including ahu whenua trustees, and the commitment by courts to observe such onerous duties. With regard to the allegation of resiling from a unanimous decision to support a particular proposal, Harvey J noted that her actions resulted in the Trust becoming embroiled in litigation and incurring unnecessary legal costs. This was, in the Judge's view, conduct that was 'both imprudent and inappropriate'. 60 If a trustee appears to be at an impasse with the other trustees, the duty is upon the trustees to seek direction from the court, which, in this case, was not undertaken. It mattered not to the court that the trustee acted with honest belief that her actions were correct, her actions were still judged as being unreasonable, because she acted contrary to legal advice and in defiance of earlier agreements. 61 Grazing stock, growing crops, and removing timber for personal benefit, with no gain or benefit for the shareholders, by a trustee breached such obligations.
Failing to take steps to rectify issues with trust property may also result in a finding that trustees' actions resulted in unsatisfactory conduct. This issue was raised in the Court of Appeal in the case of Rameka v Hall.
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The question for the Court, inter alia, was whether or not the trustees in question carried out their duties satisfactorily in relation to a number of transactions involving significant amounts of money. In relation to the meaning of satisfactory conduct, the Court referred to Bramley v Hiruharama Ponui Inc-Committee of Management-Hiruharama Ponui Inc, where the Court made reference to the following passage: 65 Whether governance performance has been satisfactory or not must depend then on whether there is a clear and present apprehension of risk to the incorporation asset or to the wider interests of the incorporation shareholders as a result of action or inaction of the committee. It is not every unsatisfactory act or omission which should lead to removal, but those that go to the principles of the Act. To adopt any other approach, would lead to removal being the primary remedy available for any technical breach of the Act.
We do not think that wholesale removal of Maori governance members is consistent with the principles of the Act or the intentions of the legislature.
While it was acknowledged that the case of Bramley involved a corporation, the provisions referred to above are applicable, and therefore the Court, in assessing the conduct of the trustees, would need to 59 consider the impact of their actions on the beneficiaries and any 'apprehension of risk to the assets'.
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In relation to the mussel farm venture, the Court concurred with the lower courts that as the investment went sour, the trustees failed to act prudently. Rather the: matter was simply allowed to drag on for too long, given the considerable sums of money involved. 67 In order to have acted satisfactorily, the trustees could have taken a number of steps to discharge their duties, including expressing and recording their opposition to the ongoing investment of funds in to the venture. When looked at as a whole, the trustees should have done more to protect the trust assets, and the key factors in arriving at this conclusion were the magnitude of the sums involved and the extended period of inaction.
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In relation to one of the transactions, that of the Tauhara land purchase, a defence was raised that there was cultural significance in regaining the land, which reflects the added obligations on Maori land trustees over other types of trustees. However, the Court stated clearly that: the motivation to regain land of cultural significance does not displace the duties on the trustees to act prudently. Therefore, while culturally significant endeavours are laudable and understandable, Maori land trustees are still obliged to ensure that they are meeting their trustee obligations, as reflected in relation to this ahu whenua trust. Overall, therefore the Court of Appeal concluded that the trustees committed a series of breaches of their duties, causing substantial losses to the trust, thus their conduct was unsatisfactory.
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It is evident therefore that ahu whenua trustees have onerous obligations to meet under the requirements of various statutory and common law provisions, and this is equally the case with trustees of whanau trusts.
Whanau
It will be recalled from earlier in the article that these are share-managed type trusts, which were introduced under the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. Under them, land interests of the living or the deceased owner are vested in trustees, generally family members, and no further succession or fragmentation occurs. 72 In other words, these trusts are familyorientated trusts that allow whanau to bring together their interests for the benefit of that whanau and their descendants. Often these trusts will operate under the umbrella of ahu whenua trusts or Maori incorporation. As long as the trust exists, there will be no succession, thus the land interests remain vested in the trustees. However, should a beneficiary die, the Maori Land Court may determine a successor, as this may assist the trustees to maintain the whakapapa. 
Articles
As is apparent therefore, such trusts are strongly focused on whanau, and the Act sets out their purpose as follows: 74 The land, money, and other assets of a whanau trust shall be held, and the income derived from those assets shall be applied, for the purposes of promoting the health, social, cultural and economic welfare, education and vocational training, and general advancement in life of the descendants of any tipuna (whether living or dead) named in the order.
Since their introduction in July 1993, these trusts have become a popular vehicle to prevent fragmentation of interests in Maori land. 75 The benefits for
Maori in creating whanau trusts are therefore clear, however, what some cases reveal is a tension between whanau and trustees, and indeed divisions of whanau themselves. We will explore some cases to assess the courts' ability to acknowledge Maori beliefs and practices in alignment with recognizing the applicability of the relevant law with regard to whanau trusts.
Benefits of whanau trusts
The relevance of whanau trusts in the administration of Maori land was illustrated in Re Hauai. Therefore, the Court's assessment of the issues at stake was fundamental in coming to a decision as to whether transfers of land should occur because of the relationships, obligations, legal requirements, and interests involved. The applicant in this case saw his daughters as having the right skills to administer the land in the future, and His Honour had no doubt that he was correct in this assessment, however, His Honour asserted that:
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. . . absolute gifting as proposed is . . . a very blunt legal tool which will exclude half of his children and their descendants from Hauai lands.
The applicant's remaining son had given his permission for such a gift to take place, as he was of the view that his sisters would not alienate the land from the family, however, Ambler J reflected that an absolute gift was not the most appropriate course of action when taking in to consideration whanau matters. In his view, the best legal approach would be to create a whanau trust, which assist the applicant in achieving his aims for his whanau. The whanau trust could include express provisions to accommodate the applicant's kaupapa 80 for the land. Indeed, such a trust would enable the daughters to have all the powers necessary to administer the land, but without excluding any of the applicant's descendants. One daughter expressed dissatisfaction with such a trust because she asserted that it would lead to ongoing disputes with the deceased son's widow and his children. Ambler J, however, asserted that the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 expects Maori to look beyond such things and instead she should focus on the late brother's children and their descendants, thus reflecting the importance of the significance of the Act in Maori land matters. As a result, the Judge concluded that the proposed gifting would contravene the kaupapa of the Act, thus section 164 could not properly be invoked. He also noted that he could not insist on the applicant agreeing to a whanau trust, but equally, he was of the view that the application must be dismissed because it was not in the best interests of the whanau. 81 Thus, while some members of the whanau believed that an absolute gift to be the most appropriate method of administering land, the Court could not reconcile the opposing purpose of the Act and the purpose of the applicant. Therefore, this case illustrates the very clear tensions that may arise in such circumstances and how a court is able to align cultural, holistic, and legal requirements in an objective and appropriate manner with regard to the application of whanau trusts.
Tensions between whanau were a key consideration in two very recent cases before the Maori Land Court, where the Court had to consider the level of dysfunction within a whanau trust, and then whether partial termination of the trust would be an appropriate course of action to take. ArticlesThus the objective is to ensure the best interests of the beneficiaries. The Court further noted that the purpose of this trust was to bring together all the interests of the Te Kou Tiaki and Rangi Ataahua whanau. With the death of one of the trustees, the trust has not been in a position to best manage the interests of the beneficiaries because the trustees had been inactive. Further, there was discord between the applicant and the trustees. The applicant believed that because he was their elder, he did not have to listen to them, and the Court was concerned that he would attempt to do what he wished and ignore the trustees. He was determined to have his shares released from this trust, but the Court had to weigh that desire against the reason as to why he wants to terminate the trust. It was noted, inter alia, that the applicant was of the view that the trustees had not utilized the Trust property to the best interest of the applicant; that the trustees had been working against the applicant; there was a lack of involvement by the trustees in the Trust; and that due to the dysfunction of the Trust, he cannot work with the trustees. 84 The Court noted that any termination would have an impact on the remaining beneficiaries adversely because there would be a loss of voting power, and some potential development, now that the trustees were active once again. There was also overwhelming beneficiary and trustee opposition to the partial termination.
Whanau trusts and dysfunction
Also of note to the Court in their determination was the consideration a Court might have when assessing the merit of a partial termination: While the Court acknowledged the dysfunctional relationship that existed between the applicant and the trustee, when weighed against the other factors, and taking in to account the Preamble, sections 2 and 17, the order for a partial termination was not granted. It was evident that divisions were entrenched in the whanau, but it would not be in the interests of the applicant or the other beneficiaries to allow the application. The applicant could not achieve the objectives he set for his shares, and he provided no sufficient reason to warrant such a course of action. Neither was there any credible evidence as to future development options.
What this decision therefore indicates is that while whanau may be divided, or there may be some dysfunction within the whanau or trust, the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act, the Courts, and whanau trusts, operate to ensure the benefit for the totality of the whanau, so the greater good of the whanau is given weight in preference to individual desires, which is a reflection of the strength of whanua relationships.
The 2015 Maori Land Court case of Moa Larkins v Hurae and Ngawiata Whanau Trust 86 eloquently expressed the notions of whanau, and in particular, this case focused on the concept of whanau trusts and unity, even in the face of dysfunction. The whanau trust was constituted for the benefit of the descendants of Jack and Ngawaiata Larkins. At the time of the application, there were three generations of descendants who were beneficiaries of the whanau trust, who would be impacted by its partial termination. Moa Larkins, the eldest of the seven children of Jack Larkins, sought a partial termination of this trust. and his siblings, were entitled. Moa Larkins gave evidence that he had not seen 'eye to eye' with his siblings for many years, and while the trust was supposed to unify the whanau, in reality, it had not resolved their underlying differences. He expressed concern that the Trust was not performing satisfactorily, thus he sought to remove the interests in Waihou Hutoia D2A from the Trust. 87 Interestingly, the applicant acknowledged that removing Waihou Hutoia D2A interests would in fact not address the alleged dysfunction within the Trust, as other interests contributed by Moa would remain in the Trust. He also could not provide information as to what he wished the whanau trust to do with Waihou Hutoia D2A interests, and merely argued that he wished those interests to be returned. The real issue was the relationships between the siblings, not the Trust itself. 88 The Court determined that a partial termination of the Trust would not in fact achieve a better retention, use, development, and control of the Waihou Hutoia D2A land. Whether the land interests were held by the whanau trust, or by Moa, would not make any difference to the ability of the member of the whanau to build on that land. Further, there was no evidence before the Court to persuade it that the functioning of this whanua trust was an impediment to any member of the whanau building on that land. 89 The next consideration was the purpose of the whanau trust. This was set out in the objects clause, and reads: 90 To administer and preserve the interests of the whanau and to use the income derived from those interests to be applied for the purposes of promoting health, social, cultural and economic welfare, education, and vocational training and general advancement in the life of the beneficiaries of the whanau trust.
It was noted that this purpose is virtually the same for all whanau trusts constituted under the Act, and the Court could find nothing in the purposes that would suggest any form of exception should be made for the interests that Moa contributed. What needed to be emphasized was the purpose of this whanau trust. That was to bring some unity to the whanau who had received different interests from their parents over the years. 91 In reality, the partial termination of the trust by removing the Waihou Hutoia D2A interests would 'contravene the very purpose of and rationale for the trust'. 92 The removal of those interests would, in the Court's view, be a clear and substantial detriment to the other beneficiaries.
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Turning finally to the underlying issue of the dysfunction within the whanau trust, the Court noted that there was very limited evidence of actual dysfunction. 94 In reality, this was not a case 'where a whanau trust has been so dysfunctional that it is beyond redemption'. 95 Rather, Moa had had a change of heart and wished to retrieve the interests in that specific block of land to which he had contributed the whanau trust. In such circumstances:
a change of mind in the face of such opposition is not enough to justify removing interests from the whanau trust.
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This notion of dysfunction was finally put to bed when the Court asserted that Moa would remain as a trustee and a beneficiary on the trust, thus a partial termination would not resolve any alleged dysfunction. In other words, the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction requires that under section 216(4), sufficient notice and opportunity must be given for discussion tests to be satisfied, as well as there being no laudable objections to such a trust being created. 107 Once such a trust is created, the assets of the trust are held in accordance with Maori community purposes for the general benefit of the iwi. Therefore, all the Court needs to be concerned with, in considering whether to create such a trust, is whether the tests for the creation of such a body have been satisfied. He noted, importantly, that the benefit of such a trust is that it does not require the continuation of succession, and thus the subsequent fragmentation of interests. 110 This clearly is of advantage for Maori interests within Maori land, thus it is understandable why courts may promote their creation, where applicable to do so. However, as his Honour noted, it is for the beneficiaries and trustees to consider the merits of such a trust.
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As is evident with whenua topu trusts, the interests of iwi must be represented, and the very recent case of Te Runanga o Ngati Maru (Taranaki) Whenua Topu Trust, 112 discussed just this issue, which is our final matter for discussion on Maori land trusts. It was alleged that the trustees failed to represent the interests of Ngati Maru on all matters by, inter alia, failing to act as representatives for the iwi with local council, the Department of Conservation, and other third parties. One of the objects of the Trust was to represent the interests of Ngati Maru on all matters relating to the land and including use of the Trust's facilities.
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As Harvey J noted, if the trustees were not conferring with their beneficiaries on a regular basis, then it would be difficult to see how they were able to fulfil this requirement satisfactorily. It is obvious that where trustees are obliged to represent interests of a tribe, 'consultation with the constituents on a regular and continuing basis is necessary'.
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His Honour did acknowledge that the trustees had tried to meet their obligations oftentimes challenging circumstances, however, trying to meet obligations is not the same as actually meeting them. Where there are difficulties in meeting such obligations, the onus is on the trustees to seek direction from the court,
